Реферат: Европейская денежная система

 How should a monetary policy strategy be selected in this - for monetary policy makers, at least - potentially difficult environment? The EMI outlined a number of 'guiding principles' for the selection of a monetary strategy by the ESCB. Foremost amongst these was the principle of 'effectiveness'. The best monetary policy strategy for the ESCB is the one which best signals a credible and realistic commitment to, and ensures achievement of, the primary objective of price stability.

 For many commentators, this criterion points unambiguously in the direction of so-called 'direct inflation targeting'. If monetary strategies are to be judged according to how well they achieve price stability, defined as a low rate of measured inflation, then advocates of inflation targets argue an optimal strategy would surely target this low inflation rate directly. These commentators would place explicit quantitative targets for inflation itself at the centre of the ESCB's monetary policy strategy. Their approach has been strongly endorsed in some academic and central banking circles.

 But, in the current circumstances, a pure 'direct inflation targeting' strategy is too simplistic for the ESCB, and possibly even mis-conceived. The ESCB well understands the primacy of price developments and price stability for monetary policy making. Indeed, the Treaty's mandate is unambiguous in this respect. We will signal our intentions on this dimension very clearly by making a transparent public announcement of our definition of price stability. The current low level of long-term nominal interest rates in the euro area suggests that the financial markets, at least, understand and believe the over-riding priority that we attach to achieving price stability.

 Regarding strategy, our choice therefore need not be governed solely by a desire to signal our intent to maintain price stability. This has already been well-established - by the Treaty, and by the success of the convergence process in reducing inflation in Europe to its current low level. Rather than signalling our intent, the strategy must constitute a practical guide that ensures monetary policy is effective in achieving the goal we have been set.

 In this respect, there are considerable problems with using inflation itself as the direct target within the ESCB's overall strategy. Because of the well-known lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the economy in general, and the price level in particular, it is impossible for a central bank to control inflation directly. Therefore, 'inflation targeting' in practice means 'inflation forecast targeting' where central banks set monetary policy to keep their best forecast of inflation at the target level deemed consistent with price stability.

 But recognition of this need for forecasts in an inflation targeting strategy immediately raises practical difficulties. In the uncertain environment likely to exist at the outset of Monetary Union, forecasting inflation will be very difficult, not least for the conceptual, empirical and practical reasons I outlined a moment ago. Forecasting models estimated using historic data may not offer a reliable guide to the behaviour of the euro area economy under Monetary Union. Forecast uncertainty is likely to be relatively large, possibly rendering the whole inflation targeting strategy ineffective.

 To address these uncertainties, a large element of judgement would have to be introduced into the forecasting process, in order to allow for the regime shifts and structural and institutional changes that are a seemingly inevitable consequence of EMU. Simply relying on historic relationships to forecast future developments is unlikely to prove accurate or effective. While introducing judgmental adjustments into forecasts in these circumstances would be both appropriate and necessary, such adjustments are likely to compromise the transparency of the inflation forecasts and, thus, of any inflation targeting strategy. Using judgement may prevent outside observers from readily assessing the reliability and robustness of the inflation forecasting procedures used by the ESCB.

 I see a distinct bias in the academic discussion of the comparative advantages of inflation targeting and monetary targeting. With good reason, many arguments are presented against the ESCB adopting a monetary target. But proponents of inflation targeting seem to forget that, in the current context, most of these arguments could also be used against inflation targeting. Above all, I have not seen any attempt thus far - even if only a tentative one - to explain how the ESCB should deal with the specific difficulties involved in making an inflation forecast at the outset of Monetary Union that could be used as the centrepiece of an inflation targeting strategy.

 In many respects, a strategy giving a prominent role to monetary aggregates has considerable advantages over direct inflation targeting. Monetary aggregates are published. They are clearly not subject to various kinds of 'judgmental manipulation' by policy makers or central bank staff that might be possible with inflation forecasts. To the extent that policy makers wish to depart from the signals offered by monetary growth because of 'special factors' or 'distortions' to the data - including those distortions arising from the transition to Monetary Union itself - they will have to do so in a public, clear and transparent manner.

 Moreover, a strategy that assigns a prominent role to the monetary aggregates emphasises the responsibility of the ESCB for the monetary impulses to inflation, which a central bank can control more readily than inflation itself. These monetary impulses are the most important determinants of inflation in the medium term, while various other factors, such as terms of trade or indirect tax shocks, may influence the price level over shorter horizons.

 In the light of these considerations, it was agreed at the EMI that, regardless of the final choice of the monetary policy strategy, monetary aggregates would be accorded a prominent role in the overall monetary framework adopted by the ESCB.

 However, the EMI also noted that certain technical pre-conditions would have to be met before this 'prominent role' could be translated into an explicit, publicly announced monetary target, guideline, benchmark or monitoring range. Specifically, such targets or ranges would only be meaningful guides to monetary policy if the relationship between money and prices - as encapsulated in a 'demand for money' equation - was expected to remain sufficiently stable.

 In this regard, several existing empirical studies point towards the stability of the demand for euro area-wide monetary aggregates. However, these studies are necessarily only preliminary. The reliability of these results in the face of the uncertainties raised by the transition to Stage Three is unknown. Future shifts in the velocity of money are certainly possible - perhaps even likely. They cannot be predicted with certainty. Moreover, it is not clear whether those aggregates that have the best results in terms of stability are sufficiently controllable in the short-term with the policy instruments available to the ESCB. In these circumstances, relying on a pure strategy of strict monetary targeting is simply too risky.

 Against this background, the ESCB will have to design a monetary policy strategy of its own. The chosen strategy will show as much as possible continuity with the successful strategies that participating NCBs conducted in the Stage Two. At the same time the ESCB's strategy will take into account to the extent needed the unique situation created by the introduction of the euro.

4. The new monetary policy instruments and procedures for the euro area

 Having a well-designed monetary strategy is vital. But we must also be able to implement it successfully at an operational level. What instruments are available to implement this strategy?

 The ECB will have a complete set of monetary policy instruments at its disposal. These instruments have been selected on the basis of their efficiency for transmitting monetary policy and their neutrality across market participants.

 Three types of instruments are available to the ESCB: open market operations, standing facilities and a minimum reserve system. I will briefly present these instruments in the remainder of my speech.

4.1 Open market operations

 Open market operations include, first, a weekly main refinancing operation, which will take the form of a reverse repurchase transaction with a maturity of two weeks. The main refinancing operation will be based on a tender procedure. The tender may be a fixed rate tender, with counterparties bidding amounts, or a floating rate tender, where counterparties propose bids including both amounts and interest rates.

 Second, there is the monthly longer term refinancing operation, which has a maturity of three months and will always take the form of an interest rate tender. This is because the ECB will avoid signalling its monetary policy stance through these particular operations.

 The ECB will also conduct fine-tuning operations, through the national central banks of the euro area or, in exceptional circumstances, on its own account. Fine tuning operations will be conducted whenever liquidity or money market conditions warrant. Fine tuning operations may take the form of reverse repurchase transactions (that is, the same type of transaction as that used in the main refinancing and the longer term refinancing operations, but with no pre-set start date nor a pre-set maturity), foreign exchange swaps or the taking of fixed-term deposits. Fine tuning operations in the form of reverse repurchase operations may be executed either through quick tenders or bilaterally. In both cases, these operations will involve a limited set of eligible counterparties that have an appropriate track record of activity in the money market. The other types of fine tuning operations will also be executed with a limited number of eligible counterparties, which will be selected ex ante by the ECB. In some countries, there will be a rotation scheme, which will aim at giving the opportunity to all eligible fine tuning counterparties to participate in fine tuning operations.

 Finally, open market operations may also be conducted whenever structural reasons, such as the longer-term evolution of liquidity profiles, warrant it. These so-called structural operations may take the form of outright purchases or sales of securities or the issuance of debt certificates by the ECB.

4.2 Standing facilities

 The ECB will operate two overnight standing facilities, which will be available to all credit institutions at national central banks of the euro area, provided that, when using the marginal lending facility, they have sufficient collateral. The rate of the marginal lending facility will constitute the upper bound of collateralised overnight money market rates. The deposit facility will be remunerated at a rate that will constitute the lower bound of overnight money market rates.

 When using the marginal lending facility, or, for that matter, when entering in liquidity-providing open market operations in the form of reverse transactions, counterparties have to post assets with their national central bank (or the ECB in the exceptional case when the ECB conducts fine tuning operations on its own account). These assets are meant to act as guarantees for credits received from the European System of Central Banks. A list of eligible assets has been drawn up for this purpose. The list comprises a wide variety of assets and has two sub-sets. First, the so-called tier one assets, which are selected by the ECB according to uniform criteria relating to their credit standing in the whole euro area. Second, the so-called tier two assets, which have been selected by the ECB because they are of particular importance for certain national banking systems of the euro area, in order to promote a certain degree of continuity at the start of the Stage Three of EMU. Two principles of equal treatment are applied, however. First, the credit standing of tier two assets is as high as that of tier one assets. Second, both tier one and tier two assets may be used by any credit institution in the euro area, irrespective of its location.

 In addition, a set of risk control measures has been elaborated to ensure that, for any counterparty, the amount of assets provided is always sufficient. Risk control measures cover the assets' price and credit risks, taking account of the asset type, its characteristics and the maturity of the transaction. The ECB's risk control measures have been elaborated with careful attention to the best market practices in this area. They include the deduction of haircuts from the assets and the imposition of initial margins to the credit amount. Another feature of the risk control framework is the regular revaluations of the assets, which will, in most cases, take place daily and may trigger margin calls, most often to be settled through delivery of additional assets.

4.3 Minimum reserve system

 The ECB will also apply a minimum reserve system to credit institutions of the euro area. Two main monetary policy objectives have been assigned to the minimum reserve system. The first objective is to stabilise money market interest rates through the averaging mechanism, whereby the fulfilment of minimum reserve requirements is based on average reserve holdings over monthly periods of time. During the maintenance period, this allows the banking system to absorb liquidity shocks. The reduced volatility of money market rates will reduce the need for frequent fine tuning operations, which will mean that markets are less distorted by central bank interventions than they would otherwise be. The second objective of the minimum reserve system is to enlarge the demand for central bank money, so as to enlarge the liquidity deficit of the banking system vis-а-vis the ESCB. This will safeguard the role of the European System of Central Banks as a provider of liquidity to the banking system.

 Reserve requirements will be calculated by applying a reserve ratio of 1.5% to 2.5% to the deposits, debt securities and money market paper issued by credit institutions, except for residual maturities above two years. Although repurchase agreements are included in the reserve base, they will be subject to a zero reserve ratio. Inter-bank liabilities and liabilities vis-а-vis the ESCB will not be subject to reserve requirements. An allowance of the order of E 100,000 will be deducted from reserve requirements, so that credit institutions with a small reserve base will not have to hold minimum reserves.

 Reserve holdings will be remunerated up to the required reserve level, at the rate of the main refinancing operation (as averaged over a month). It may be argued that a less than full remuneration of minimum reserves would increase the interest rate elasticity of central bank money demand. This notwithstanding, the ECB has decided in favour of a full remuneration of minimum reserves in view of the distortion to efficient markets that a less than full remuneration would have implied. As a result of the full remuneration of minimum reserves, the European Central Bank has also decided not to exempt any credit institution from the minimum reserve system.

4.4 Procedures

 The ECB will have many counterparties and be subject to close public scrutiny. It has therefore set up procedures for informing its counterparties and the public about its monetary policy instruments in a robust and transparent manner.

 The ECB will inform its counterparties and the public through a document detailing its monetary policy instruments and procedures and through the regular publication of various materials on its Internet site.

General Documentation

 The ECB has produced a document describing its monetary policy instruments and procedures in detail. This is called "General Documentation on ESCB Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures". A revised version of this document was published recently. This revised version includes all the newly specified elements of the monetary policy framework of the ECB, including for instance the minimum reserve system. This document also includes a calendar for the standard tender operations in 1999 (both main refinancing and longer term refinancing operations). Calendars of standard tender operations will be published by the ECB every year.

Publications on the ECB's Internet site

 The list of assets that are eligible as guarantees for liquidity providing operations will be made public on the Internet site of the ECB. The list will be updated on a weekly basis and users will be able to subscribe to an e-mailing facility for receiving certain designated parts of the list on a regular basis. Users will also be able to query the list, which will contain a large number of assets.

 The list of institutions subject to minimum reserves, that is, credit institutions established in the euro area, will also be available on the Internet site of the ECB, together with the list of all monetary and financial institutions in the European Union.

5. Concluding remarks

 We are less than three months away from the moment when monetary policy sovereignty is transferred from the NCBs to the ESCB. The bulk of the preparatory work has already been completed, but major decisions - above all, the choice of a monetary policy strategy - still have to be made. The public can be certain that we will always inform them, regularly and comprehensively, about our considerations and deliberations. We will make all our decisions transparent. I have no doubt that we will be well prepared for the moment at which we take over responsibility for monetary policy in the euro area.

The euro as an international currency

Speech delivered by Eugenio Domingo Solans,

Member of the Governing Council and the Executive Board of the

European Central Bank,

at The Athens Summit '99,

in Athens on 18 September 1999

     Thank you for inviting me to the Athens Summit '99 and for giving      me the opportunity to speak to you at this important event.

     I should like to share with you my views, and the ECB's views, on      the importance of the euro as an international currency. I      understand that this issue may be of interest to experts from      Greece, a "pre-in" country which intends to join the euro area,      and to many participants from countries outside the euro area and      the European Union, some of which currently have exchange rate      regimes related to the euro.

     Nowadays the euro is the second most widely used currency in the      world economy, behind the US dollar and ahead of the Japanese      yen. As we all know, any currency fulfils three basic functions:      it is a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of      account. As a store of value the use of the euro as an investment      and financing currency is rapidly increasing, as investors      understand the advisability of diversifying their portfolio      currencies among those which are more stable and more      internationally used. The euro is developing at a slower pace as      a medium of exchange or payment currency in the international      exchange of goods and services. This fact can easily be explained      by the combined and reinforcing effects of network externalities      and economies of scale in the use of a predominant international      currency as a medium of exchange, as is the case with the US      dollar. The use of the euro as a unit of account is linked to its      use as a store of value and a medium of exchange. The value      stored in euro or the payments made in euro will tend to be      counted in euro.

     There are good reasons to expect an increase in international      public use of the euro as a reserve, intervention and pegging      currency, inasmuch as the public authorities understand that it      is worthwhile to allocate their foreign reserves among the main      international currencies and to give the euro a relevant share in      accordance with its internal and external stability and the      economic and financial importance of the euro area.

     In connection with the use of the euro as a pegging currency,      approximately 30 countries outside the euro area currently have      exchange rate regimes involving the euro to a greater or lesser      extent. These exchange rate regimes are currency boards      (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia); currencies pegged to the      euro (Cyprus, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 14      African countries in which the CFA franc is the legal tender);      currencies pegged to a basket of currencies including the euro,      in some cases with a fluctuation band (Hungary, Iceland, Poland,      Turkey, etc.); systems of managed floating in which the euro is      used informally as the reference currency (Czech Republic, Slovak      Republic and Slovenia); and, last but not least, European Union      currencies pegged to the euro through a co-operative arrangement,      namely ERM II. As you well know, Denmark and Greece joined ERM II      on 1 January 1999 with a ±2.25% fluctuation band for the Danish      krone and a ±15% fluctuation band for the Greek drachma. Although      the euro remains in second position after the US dollar in terms      of its official use, the role of the euro will increase in the      future, without a doubt, especially after the year 2002 when the      euro banknotes and coins will begin to circulate.

     Taking the current situation as a starting point, the      Eurosystem's position concerning the future international role of      the euro is crystal clear: we shall not adopt a belligerent      stance in order to force the use of the euro upon the world      economy. We are convinced that the use of the euro as an      international currency will come about anyway. It will happen      spontaneously, slowly but inexorably, without any impulses other      than those based on free will and the decisions of market      participants, without any logic other than that of the market. In      other words, the internationalisation of the euro is not a policy      objective of the Eurosystem; it will neither be fostered nor      hindered by us. The development of the euro as an international      currency will be a market-driven process, a free process.

     The euro fulfils the necessary conditions to be a leading      international currency with the US dollar and not against it.      There is enough room for both currencies in the world economy.      The necessary conditions for a currency to become an      international currency are based on two broad factors: low risk      and large size. The low risk factor is related to the confidence      inspired by the currency and its central bank, which in turn      mainly depends on the internal and external stability of the      currency. The low risk factor tends to lead to diversification      among international currencies, since diversification is a means      to reduce the overall risk; it acts, so to speak, as a      centrifugal force. By contrast, the large size factor relates to      the relative demographic economic and financial importance of the      area which supports the currency; in other words, the "habitat"      of the currency. The large size factor, which concerns the      demographic, economic and financial dimension, generally tends to      lead to centralisation around one or a few key international      currencies. It can be seen as a centripetal force, as a virtuous      circle, which will tend to lead to an increasing use of the euro      as an international currency. Let us consider these two factors      in more detail.

     The first factor concerns low risk, credibility and stability.      The stability of the euro is a priority for the ECB. Compared      with the idea of stability, the strength of the euro is of lesser      importance. This does not mean that the exchange rate of the euro      does not constitute an element to be considered in the second      pillar of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB, which consists      of a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price      developments and risks to stability obtained from a wide range of      economic indicators, the euro exchange rate being one of them.      However, the basic factor that will determine the importance of      the euro as a widely used currency in the world economy, in      addition to the demographic, economic and financial dimensions of      the euro area, is, without a doubt, the stability of the new      currency, understood as a means to maintain the purchasing power      of savings.

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